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ABSTRACT  
This article explores different regulatory approaches that have shaped regulation in the run-up to and 
aftermath of the 2007-09 global financial crisis. In doing so it seeks to clarify and cast fresh light upon 
the shifting regulatory and practitioner discourse. This in turn is intended to aid reflection on how 
these approaches might best be adopted, adapted or synchronised to achieve the aims of financial 
regulation. The first part of this article examines the approaches from a theoretical perspective, 
discussing their strengths and weaknesses. The second part of the article analyses regulation in 
practice, focussing primarily on rules-based regulation and principles-based regulation. As a practical 
example, the article looks at the MiFID directive – a cornerstone of securities regulation – within the 
EU and UK jurisdictional context. The article concludes with observations and comments on how 
these approaches might best be coordinated to achieve the broader regulatory agenda. 
 
SUMMARY: 1. Introduction. – 2. A review of rules-based regulation and principles-based regulation. 
– 3. Risk-based, outcomes-oriented and judgement based regulation: the current trends in the UK 
financial markets. 4. The EU regulatory strategy for the securities market. – 5. The UK and 
Continental securities regulation: in search of a possible link. – 6. Accountable regulation of market 
participants and investor protection. – 7. Concluding remarks. 
 
Key words: investor protection, stakeholders, financial regulation, principles-based regime, rules-
based regulation, risk-based regulation, judgement-based regulation, disclosure-based regulation, 
merit-based regulation, compliance function, outcomes-oriented regulation and risk management. 
 
1.  Financial markets provide the venue (real or virtual) and mechanisms for societal 
coordination by allowing buyers, sellers and intermediaries to value, transform and transfer 
resources. Their purpose – in the main – is to help bridge societal preferences in relation to 
maturity, liquidity, size and risk. Viewed holistically, and in the context of the satisfaction of 
societal needs, it is envisaged that well-functioning financial markets can be used where 
appropriate to allocate resources and risk in a transparent and competitive
1
 manner, 
facilitating economic development and progress within socially agreed boundaries
2
 to both 
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1
 Competition may not be considered the most appropriate remedy for natural monopolies for example. In such 
circumstances, it would not be appropriate to pursue higher levels of competition just as an end in itself.  
2
 D. Campbell and S. Picciotto, ‘Exploring the interaction between law and economics: the limits of formalism’ 
 2 
the applicability of marketisation
3
 and its limitations.
4
  
Faith in the sustainability and integrity of financial markets is of importance in societies 
that wish to largely rely upon market-based allocation of financial resources and risks in the 
long run. Such trust, in turn cements the role of markets as the primary choice of social 
institution used for resource allocation. Financial regulation serves as a community safeguard 
to proactively ensure safety, soundness and appropriate behaviour in financial markets. Given 
the inherent fragility entailed by the transformative activities undertaken in financial markets, 
it would be naïve not to recognise that institutional collapse or misbehaviour by financial 
intermediaries can have far-reaching societal consequences that are not easily remedied. As 
Beltran observes “the costs of preventive actions are usually tangible, clearly allocated and 
often short term, whereas the costs of failing to act are less tangible, less clearly distributed 
and usually longer term”.5  
The importance of financial regulation must not therefore be underestimated. It is also 
important to recognize at the outset that financial regulation, in its role protecting the interests 
of societal stakeholders at large, is therefore imbued with both a socio-political purpose (such 
as protecting the interests of future generations or distributive justice) and an economic 
imperative (typically discussed within the welfare economics approaches to market failure).
6
 
In the above context, this article sets out the thinking behind seven key regulatory 
approaches that have impacted financial regulation (particularly in the EU and the UK) in the 
run-up to and aftermath of the global financial crisis of 2007 (the GFC). These approaches 
are: rules-based regulation, principles-based regulation, outcomes-oriented regulation, risk-
based regulation, judgement-based regulation, disclosure-based regulation and merit-based 
regulation. Our aim is to clarify and cast fresh light upon the weaknesses in the regulatory and 
practitioner discourse
7
 and to corral a range of ideas so as to add depth to the discussion and 
allow for more critical reflection on whether these approaches might best be adopted or 
synchronised to better achieve the purpose of regulation.  
In reviewing these materials, our analysis takes into consideration the evidence-based 
                                                                                                                                                                  
(1998) 18(3) Legal Studies, 249-250. 
3
 A market-based solution may not be the optimal way to allocate resources in certain circumstances. For 
example, we may find that a market in child labourers or human body parts may not necessarily desirable. 
4
 Implicit here is the view that not everything can and/or should be valued through markets. See Sandel, What 
Money Can’t Buy: The Moral Limits of Markets, Allen Lane, United Kingdom, 2012. 
5
 J. Beltran, ‘Late lessons from early warnings: the precautionary principle 1896–2000’, Environmental Report 
No 22, European Environmental Agency, Copenhagen, 2001 at 
http://www.eea.europa.eu/publications/environmental_issue_report_2001_22.  
6
 D.G. Driver, Governance, Financial, Regulation, Risk and Compliance: An Integrated Approach (John Wiley 
and Sons, forthcoming). 
7
 E. Engelen, I. Erturk, J. Froud, S. Johal, A. Leaver, M. Moran, A. Nilsson and K. Williams, After the Great 
Complacence: Financial Crisis and the Politics of Reform (Oxford University Press, 2011). 
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study presented by Di Lorenzo who rightly points out that “the public policy debate regarding 
the preference for principles-based or rules-based regulatory structures to achieve legislative 
congruence ignores the important role, often determinative role, of government enforcement 
measures”8. We are cognisant of an inherent bias when the predominant assumption within 
the supporting literature is of requiring regulatory efficiency and effectiveness and the 
acceptability of a non-zero failure regime rather than a more comprehensive safety culture.
9
 
There is also an assumption that greater efficiency equates to lower costs and bureaucracy for 
the regulated community while a broader view of efficiency in terms of medium to long term 
social outcomes is typically underplayed in such discussions. 
 
2.   Rules-based regulation is a cornerstone of financial regulation in many jurisdictions 
including the US
10
 and the UK. Detailed rules are viewed as providing a prescriptive, specific, 
concrete, procedural, and particular way of articulating regulatory requirements
11
. Generally, 
rules-based regulation is based on the provision and communication of such detailed 
requirements, and is intended to clarify regulatory expectations and set behavioural 
boundaries ex-ante. It is therefore purported to increase certainty for regulated entities, 
regulators and stakeholders. Specificity obviates the need for specialist interpretation of 
requirements. This, in turn, serves to reduce the cost and improve the ease of compliance for 
regulated entities (in particular for small firms that may have limited specialist compliance 
resource). However, on account of this same ex-ante nature, regulation composed of detailed 
rules may be over-inclusive or under-inclusive
12
.  
If rules are specific (as intended), then, in rapidly evolving markets such as finance, 
regulation may require frequent revision to keep up with the pace of change. This requires the 
expense of scarce time and resource, causing regulators to constantly fall behind market 
practice. By their very nature, rules may also be intransigent, providing both regulated entities 
and regulators with lesser choice in interpretation and in turn result in poor outcomes for both, 
in circumstances that where greater flexibility is deemed to be valuable. A more command 
                                                 
8
 V. Di Lorenzo, ‘Principles-based regulation and legislative congruence’ (2012) 15(1) New York University 
Journal of Legislation and Public Policy. 
9
 R. Paul and M. Huber, ‘Risk-based Regulation in Continental Europe?’, HowSAFE Working Paper No 2, 
February, 2015. 
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 J. Black., ‘Paradoxes and Failures: ‘New Governance’ Techniques and the Financial Crisis’ (2012) 75(6) The 
Modern Law Review, 1037-1038. 
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 B. Burgemeestre, J. Hulstijn and Y. Tan, ‘Rules-based versus Principle-based regulatory compliance’, 
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Information Systems, 2009. 
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 J. Black, M. Hopper and C. Band, ‘Making a Success of Principles-based Regulation’ (2007) Law and 
Financial Markets Review, 191-192.  
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and control, structure is often required for the promulgation of rules
13
, denuding participatory 
ownership within the regulated community, notwithstanding any lobbying or regulatory 
capture that might accompany such regulation and influence or subvert rule-making in the 
first place. For many regulated entities, a this command-and-control approach to enforcing 
compliance with detailed rules may also engender a tick-box mindset aimed at meeting the 
‘letter of the law’14. As Frantz and Instefjord point out “the regulator must forward engineer 
the implications of compliance for the intended regulatory outcomes”15. Not only does this 
place an onus upon the regulator to prescribe the acceptable ‘hows’, it attracts criticism for 
resultantly excluding the possibility of alternative, potentially more effective processes 
undermining even those regulatees who might be able to devise more effective methods for 
meeting regulatory objectives. Worse still, rules-based regulation could be more easily subject 
to gaming through ‘creative compliance’16 and the misuse of legal and financial engineering17 
that are aimed at undermining or circumventing rules, complying with the letter of regulation 
while ignoring its spirit. 
Principles, may be understood to be more ‘generalised rules’ or ‘bright-line rules’.18 They 
offer a higher-level, normative, broad-brush and more abstract specification of regulatory 
requirements.
19
 Principles should therefore typically offer greater room to accommodate and 
interpret regulation taking into account the nuances of specific circumstances, thus facilitating 
the use of discretion when one size does not necessarily fit all. Both regulated entities and 
regulators may also more effectively apply reasoning to arriving at the right outcome.  
The locus of ownership in complying with requirements is moved to the regulated entity 
through the opportunity to exercise greater judgement, thus purportedly allowing greater 
autonomy to market participants in outlining both business strategy and acceptable modes of 
compliance with regulation. There is however a trade-off with certainty, particularly when 
judging compliance or enforcing against non-compliance ex-post, given that the regulator’s 
judgement may differ from those of the regulated entity. They may engender greater 
                                                 
13
 J. Black, Rules and Regulators (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1997). 
14
 J. Black, M. Hopper and C. Band (note 12). 
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 P. Frantz and N. Instefjord, ‘Rules vs Principles-based financial regulation’, Working paper, 2014 at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2561370. 
16
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Australian National University, Centre for Tax System Integrity, Working Paper No 18, August 2001 at 
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 D. McBarnett, ‘Financial Engineering or Legal Engineering? Legal Work, Legal Integrity and the Banking 
Crisis’ in I. MacNeil and J. O’Brien (eds), The Future of Financial Regulation (Hart, Portland, 2010). 
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 C. Ford, ‘Principles-based securities regulation in the wake of the global financial crisis’ (2010) 55 McGill 
Law Journal, 257-258. 
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 5 
uncertainty through the variety inherent in the interpretation of principles, and therefore 
principles may be more difficult to enforce.  
Principles may also be seen to facilitate ex-post re-examinations which may hold 
regulated entities up to differing standards than originally expected, due to the potential for a 
change in the thresholds against which interpretation of requirements might be carried out. 
Schwarz suggests that “unless protected by a regime enabling one in good faith to exercise 
judgment without fear of liability, such a person will effectively act as if subject to a rule and, 
even worse, an unintended rule”20. A corollary to this is offered by Sants who noted that “a 
principles-based approach does not work with individuals who have no principles”21. It is also 
worth bearing in mind that principles may require greater interpretation for appropriate 
application to circumstances, resulting in increased need for compliance expertise and 
associated costs. Like rules, subject to the quality of regulation, principles could also be 
gamed by those who chose to circumvent regulation – again the key to this lies in how the 
principles are applied and how enforcement action is taken for non-compliance.  
There are some topics that lend themselves to detailed rules and others where a principle 
may set out the regulatory requirement more clearly. For example, when regulators set 
requirements for the disclosure documents on mortgage offers, they might require by rule the 
disclosure of certain pieces of information that consumers might legitimately require in order 
to make rational comparisons. In such situations, a specific rule might be appropriate. In other 
circumstances, a principle such as requiring firms to ensure that all information provided to 
consumers is not misleading might better suit the desired outcome.  
It is also worth remembering thatPerhaps, as a result of this realisation, in practice, 
principles-based regulation – although deemed to be more sophisticated – does not implyhas 
not meant that principles alone are used to communicate regulation or that they alone exist in 
practice to the exclusion of rules or a rulebook. For example, financial conduct regulation in 
the UK is deemed to be conducted in a principles-based manner, but a detailed rulebook also 
does co-exist supplementing high-level principles with detailed rules. This appears to be the 
case more generally at other Anglo-Saxon regulators who adopt principles-based regimes. 
Ford reminds us that the difference between rules-based regimes and principles-based 
regulation is not merely in opting for one drafting format rather than the other
22
. Importantly 
                                                 
20
 S.L. Schwarcz, ‘The “Principles” Paradox’, Duke Law School Legal Studies Paper No 205, 2008. 
21
 See ‘The Turner Review. A regulatory response to the global banking crisis’, March 2009, 86-87. 
22
 C. Ford, ‘Principles-based Securities Regulation: A Research Study prepared for the Expert Panel on 
Securities Regulation at http://www.expertpanel.ca/documents/research-
studies/Principles%20Based%20Securities%20Regulation%20-%20Ford.English.pdf. The author pertinently 
notes that “whether a regulatory system fosters clarity and predictability, for example, is not entirely related to 
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what varies between principles-based and rules based regimes is how regulators are expected 
to implement regulation – from the drafting of policy rules through to supervision and 
enforcement.  
 
3.   Although the five other approaches to regulation detailed within this article carry their 
own headlines and have independent standing in regulatory practitioner literature, in practice, 
regulation using these approaches when articulated typically takes the drafted form of detailed 
rules or high level principles
23
.  
Risk-based regulation is the most widely used and accepted amongst these, and is 
recommended for adoption by international bodies including the OECD and the British 
government across a range of industries from finance to healthcare. It relates to the 
prioritisation of regulatory resources in both the functioning of the regulator as an institution 
and in the application of regulatory requirements (whether rules or principles) to regulated 
entities.  
The OECD defines risk-based regulation as follows: “a risk-based approach to regulation 
explicitly acknowledges that the government cannot regulate to remove all risks and that 
regulatory action, when taken, should be proportionate, targeted and based on an assessment 
of the nature and the magnitude of the risks and of the likelihood that regulation will be 
successful in achieving its aims”24. Accordingly, regulators are required to allocate their 
resources to problems which are deemed to carry the highest risks as are regulated entities. It 
has been noted that “rather than trying to prevent all possible harms, risk-based approaches 
promise to rationalise and manage the inevitable limits of what regulation can hope to achieve 
by focusing regulatory standard-setting and enforcement activity on the highest priority risks, 
as determined through formal assessments of their probability and consequences”25. 
In parallel, regulated entities are expected to prioritise those risks which are deemed to be 
greatest. This approach to regulation came into prominence in the UK in the 1980s and 90s 
with the emergence of what Hutter refers to as the ‘deregulatory rhetoric’26 with its emphasis 
                                                                                                                                                                  
whether it is rules-based or principles-based. The real question is whether regulator and regulatees have a shared 
understanding of what the regulations entail poor implementation can produce a system that is less transparent, 
less predictable, and less fair.” 
23
 Other formats such as standards or codes of practice may also be used but in the jurisdictions related to this 
article, rules and principles form the predominant bulk of formal communication by regulators.    
24
 OECD, Risk and Regulatory Policy: Improving the Governance of Risk, OECD Publishing, Paris, 2010 at 
http://www.keepeek.com/Digital-Asset-Management/oecd/governance/risk-and-regulatory 
policy_9789264082939-en#page1. 
25
 A. Beaussier and D. Demeritt, et al, ‘Accounting for failure: risk-based regulation and the problems of 
ensuring healthcare quality in the NHS’ (2016) 18(3-4) Health, Risk and Society, 2016. 
26
 B. Hutter, ‘The attraction of risk-based ideas in regulation: accounting for the emergence of risk ideas in 
regulation’, London School of Economics Centre for Analysis of Risk and Regulation, Discussion paper No 33, 
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on regulatory accountability, and economy in regulatory resource usage and associated 
regulatory costs, reduction of the regulatory burden on firms and the cost of compliance, as 
well as a philosophical bias towards adopting more private sector practices and styles in 
regulation.  
In Anglo-Saxon jurisdictions, such rationality has been predicated on some form of formal 
risk assessment coupled with attendant prioritisation, which is typically focused on regulatory 
efficiency. It has been argued that “risk has become a central means for making regulation 
socially optimal by using formal risk assessments of probability and consequence both to 
define regulatory objectives as well as target only the greatest threats to achieving those 
objectives”27. 
There are three key weaknesses of this regulatory approach. The first is that these risk-
based regimes can be underpinned by a very simplistic evaluation of “risk to what”28. 
Efficiency increases through risk evaluations can tend to be simplistically equated to a 
reduction in regulatory costs or the reduction in costs or bureaucracy for regulated entities 
rather than a broader regard for systemic safety and consumer protection or the pursuance of 
stakeholder interests in the medium to long term. There is also the concern that the “risk-to-
what” question can elicit very different answers based on the motivations and incentives29 of 
regulators and regulatees creating greater fuzziness in the interpretation of regulatory 
principles.  
Secondly, risk-based prioritisation requires the agreement of stakeholders in the 
acceptable negative outcomes. It is worth reflecting on the underlying point made by Sir 
Donald Irvine who noted about risk-based regulation in a medical context that it “(…) is not 
compatible with the concept of a guarantee to the public of a good doctor for all (...) need to 
demonstrate that it has the public’s fully informed consent if it decides to support this line. 
After all it is patients, not doctors, who may be killed or injured by poor doctoring”30. Thirdly, 
there is an expectation that a ‘scientific’ risk-based approach creates a high degree of 
certainty
31– whereas in reality, even with highly sophisticated models, “the real-world market 
is far richer in attributes and causal complexity than any model or collection of models is able 
to capture”.32 This does not imply that more scientific approaches to assessing and addressing 
                                                                                                                                                                  
March 2005 at https://www.lse.ac.uk/accounting/CARR/pdf/DPs/Disspaper33.pdf. 
27
 A. Beaussier and D. Demeritt, et al (note 25). 
28
 Ibid. 
29
 L. Bebchuk and H. Spamann, ‘Regulating Bankers’Pay’ (2010) Georgetown Law Journal, 247-248. 
30
http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20130107105354/http://www.dh.gov.uk/prod_consum_dh/groups/dh
_digitalassets/@dh/@en/documents/digitalasset/dh_4132991.pdf. 
31
 D. McCloskey and S. Ziliak, The Cult of Statistical Significance, University of Michigan, 2008. 
32
 Department of Social and Moral Philosophy, University of Helsinki, Purpose and Vision section of ‘The 
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risk should be eschewed, but itrather we suggest that what is is important is not to over-rely
33
 
on the sophistication of risk-based prioritisation, or to be blinded by the belief that it is always 
completely accurate in the selection of risks. 
Disclosure-based regulation (which has been evident in the securities market) is 
characterized by the premise of ‘caveat emptor’ or ‘buyer beware’. The emphasis within 
regulation here, is to ensure that regulated entities provide sufficient information to investors, 
consumers and stakeholders, so that the other party can make a rational choice without any 
paternalistic regulatory interference. Typically, disclosure-based regulation tends to be allied 
to a more rules-based approach to regulation, although this is not always the case.  
The challenges with the disclosure-based approach lie not just in setting the quality, 
frequency, and depth of disclosure, but in how recipients of information may process or 
address information disclosed to them
34
. Where Firstly, where gross information asymmetries 
exist between stakeholders, investors, consumers and the regulated entity, these may be an 
unfair onus placed on the presumed rationality of the information recipient (that may be 
exploited) causing detriment
35
. Cases from the crisis of 2007 related to the sale of sub-prime 
mortgages are an important case in point
36
. Secondly, recipients of information may be 
subject to various biases and heuristics, which may impede their rationality and which may be 
preyed upon by sophisticated marketers
37
. Thirdly, there is a presumption that those receiving 
the information are able and willing to act on behalf of all affected stakeholders. Scholars 
such as Villiers suggest that there is a misguided reliance on the role of corporate governance 
and responsible investors
38
 who may neither be willing nor able to act as gatekeepers to the 
market.   
Merit-based regulation requires regulated entities to allow the regulator to assess the 
merits and demerits of products and services that are introduced to the financial markets. The 
aim is to ensure a certain minimum quality rather than assure a consistent high quality in such 
offerings. Such merit-based regulation may take the form of pre-approval of new products, 
                                                                                                                                                                  
Market and Marketization: Models, Mechanisms and Explanation’, at 
http://www.helsinki.fi/market/purposeandvision.htm 
33
 L. Elliott and D. Atkinson, The Gods That Failed: How Blind Faith in Markets Has Cost Us Our Future, 
Nation Books, New York, 2009. 
34
 E. Avgouleas, ‘What future for disclosure as a regulatory technique? Lessons from behavioural decision 
theory and the global financial crisis’ in I. MacNeil and J. O’Brien, (eds), The Future of Financial Regulation, 
(Hart, Portland, 2010). 
35
 J. Crotty, ‘Structural causes of the global financial crisis: a critical assessment of the ‘new financial 
architecture’ (2009) 33 Cambridge Journal of Economics, 563-564. 
36
 L. Kotlikoff, Jimmy Stewart is Dead: Ending the World's Ongoing Financial Plague with Limited Purpose 
Banking (John Wiley and Sons, 2011). 
37
 J. Crotty (note 35). 
38
 C. Villiers, ‘Has the financial crisis revealed the concept of the responsible owner to be a myth?’ in I. MacNeil 
and J. O’Brien (eds), The Future of Financial Regulation (Hart, Portland, 2010). 
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licensing of certain activities and so on. Merit-based regulation is deemed to increase fairness, 
justice and equity as it seeks to address challenges arising from informational imbalances, 
complexity and conflicts of interest by proactively ensuring the quality of offering within the 
financial markets.  
Merit-based regulation is therefore a counter-point to more ‘laissez faire’ approaches to 
regulation and has attracted criticism
39
 on the grounds that it restricts financial freedoms and 
that regulators are being presumptuous in assuming they possess the skill and knowledge to 
make assessments of suitability on behalf of all investors. Additionally, there is a cost-
implication to the devotion of regulatory resources to such activities, which is often 
considered unjustified.  
As mentioned, sSuch costs are generally evaluated in terms of the regulatory burden to 
industry, rather than the wider societal consequences of introducing products which fail 
minimal tests for fairness and safety
40
.  
A judgement-based approach to regulation is consistent with a more principles-based 
approach to regulation as it affords regulators the possibility of asserting their own judgement 
(typically evidence-based) to identify and address risks and challenge business models
41
. Its 
strenghts and weakness are fairly similar to those of the principles-based approach more 
generally and its nomenclature has achieved prominence in the UK in the aftermath of the 
GFC
42
. It is worth pointing out that prior to the crisis regulators did exercise judgement while 
applying principles and rules; however the focus on regulatory judgements now appears to 
highlight the increased emphasis on regulatory skill, expertise and active regulatory 
intervention / non-intervention that is meant to accompany UK financial regulation more 
recently. 
A judgement-based approach to regulation is consistent with a more principles-based 
approach to regulation as it affords regulators the possibility of asserting their own judgement 
(typically evidence-based) to identify and address risks and challenge business models
43
. Its 
nomenclature has achieved prominence in the UK in the aftermath of the GFC
44
. This is of 
                                                 
39
 R. Columbo, ‘Merit Regulation via the Suitability Rules’ (2013) 12(1) Journal of International Business Law. 
40
 D.G. Driver (note 6). 
41
 H M Treasury, ‘A new approach to financial regulation: judgement, focus and stability’ (July 2010) at 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/81389/consult_financial_regulatio
n_condoc.pdf.  
42
 Prudential Regulation Authority, ‘The Prudential Regulation Authority’s approach to banking supervision’, 
(April 2013) at http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/Documents/praapproach/bankingappr1304.pdf. 
43
 H M Treasury, ‘A new approach to financial regulation: judgement, focus and stability’ (July 2010) at 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/81389/consult_financial_regulatio
n_condoc.pdf.  
44
 Prudential Regulation Authority, ‘The Prudential Regulation Authority’s approach to banking supervision’, 
(April 2013) at http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/Documents/praapproach/bankingappr1304.pdf. 
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course not to say that prior to the crisis regulators did not exercise a judgement-based 
approach. 
Outcomes-oriented regulation is posited by regulatory practitioners as a corollary to 
principles-based regulation in that it seeks to structure regulatory attention around the broader 
achievement of regulatory outcomes as opposed to focussing upon the procedural steps that 
need to be followed by the regulated entity. While this may lead to a better appreciation of 
big-picture, longer-term considerations by both regulated entities and regulators, more 
nuanced shorter-term detriment might be neglected in the pursuance of the broader outcome. 
This approach to drafting principles and rules assumes that regulators understand the range of 
potential outcomes – both positive and adverse.  
Outcomes-orientation is intended to encourage a broader-perspective on results for society 
and consumers. Rather than focussing on interim outputs (e.g. satisfaction scores), the aim is 
to focus on what the overall outcome (e.g. has the customer been treated fairly?). Given that 
outcomes are at a high level it is a challenge for both regulators and regulated entities to 
operationalise how they will be achieved or assessed. Management information in turn is 
often difficult to define, obtain and assess, making it difficult for regulators to offer 
substantive evidence-based challenge. In larger or complex regulated firms, achievement of 
outcomes may arise from a multiplicity of functional areas; this makes accountability difficult 
to establish and also makes it harder for regulators to take targeted enforcement or 
supervisory actions. Organisational embedding of an outcomes-orientation is challenging, 
both within regulators and within regulated entities, because cultural changes to encourage 
big-picture thinking can be difficult to establish. A good example of this lies in descriptions of 
the early challenges experienced by the former UK regulator, the FSA, in establishing the 
‘Treating Customers Fairly’ agenda in the UK45. Many of these problems are linked to and are 
very similar to the broader challenges of adopting a principles-based approach to regulation. 
Reliance is placed on regulated entities to demonstrate integrity and ethical conduct by 
regulated entities
46
.  Such aspirations may at times remain unfulfilled causing wider 
stakeholder detriment, which is difficult to repaid. Finally, an outcomes-based approach is 
characterised in some jurisdictions by voluntary law enforcement where the markets can be 
regarded as rule-makers and governance requirements act as a surrogate for statutory norms. 
                                                 
45
 FSA, ‘Treating Customers Fairly: Towards Fair Outcomes for Consumers’, July 2006. 
46
 J. Black and D. Rouch, ‘The development of the global markets as rule-makers: engagement and legitimacy’ 
(2008) 2(3) Law and Financial Markets Review, 223-225. See also J. Benjamin, P. Bowden and D. Rouch, ‘Law 
and regulation for global financial markets: markets as rule-makers – enforcement, dispute resolution and risk’ 
(2008) 2(4) Law and Financial Markets Review, 322-323; J. Benjamin and D. Rouch, ‘The international 
financial markets as a source of global law: the privatisation of rule-making?’ (2008) 2(2) Law and Financial 
Markets Review, 82-83. 
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This may be at odds with the realities of both incentives and interests
47
.  
 
4.  We will now discuss the practical implications of applying the above concepts. In 
recent years, the financial markets can be seen as the major cornerstone of the EU’s strategy 
in terms of policy efforts. What has been achieved, ensues from the Financial Services Action 
Plan (FSAP)
48
 and the numerous financial directives that the EU Institutions have adopted 
with a view to reforming the securities sector. A brief analysis can be made as to why the EU 
legislator adopted this huge financial architecture.  
First, it appears that the perceived need for better regulation and consumer protection has 
driven the EU’s strategy, also under the influence of the real integration of the markets which 
has occurred. Particularly, evidence of a desire to remove the existing national barriers as 
between Member States has marked certain directives, for example the Markets in Financial 
Instruments Directive (MiFID)
49
 and the Markets in Financial Instruments Regulation 
(MiFIR)
50
, which is considered to be the centrepiece of the FSAP
51
. This assumption can be 
measured by the growing need for harmonised securities regulation; in fact, a common set of 
rules at international level has definitively replaced the former local rules and administrative 
burdens (costs of cross-border financial activities, such as permissions, licenses and 
authorities’ approvals). The effective consequence is the adoption of shared rules and forms 
of “soft law”52. 
Secondly, these new forms of regulation have been reflected in a self-regulation regime
53
 
characterised by internal controls, best practices, compliance and “treat customers fairly” 
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programmes
54
. At first glance, the complexities of the regulatory system result in 
fragmentation and a substantive confusion of accountability; indeed, the principles adopted to 
regulate the markets do not seem to operate in a clear manner. In the last few decades, rule-
making has been considered to be too slow to keep up with innovation in the sphere of 
financial instruments (for example, in the case of derivatives) and has been relegated to the 
same level as principles, with the inevitable confusion of their respective roles. The former 
Financial Services Authority (today Financial Conduct Authority and Prudential Regulation 
Authority) has put greater stress on the use of principles-based regulation, while affirming 
that this kind of approach “means moving away from dictating through detailed prescriptive 
rules and supervisory actions how firms should operate their business”55. 
The viable solution could lie in the compliance function as a rule of financial fairness and 
a form of enforcement measure. But the role of compliance must be accepted as a proper legal 
function, generally, by markets and, in particular, by firms; in substance, the function of 
compliance can be explained as an expression of self-regulation - because it is accepted by 
market participants - with substantive legal content
56
. In addition, the difference between 
principles and rules is to be found in the role attributed to the latter: compliance with rules is 
itself a form of rule, while principles represent the first stage of rule adoption. For example, 
principles are used to treat the market fairly with a set of best practices; compliance is used to 
enforce the best practices and becomes in the final analysis a rule in the sense of jus cogens. 
Firms and companies have recognised the importance of compliance, particularly as regards 
internal controls (the audit committee), where the relationship between administrators, 
managers and investors finds its best expression in a species of self-imposed rules designed to 
reduce the risk to the firm itself
57
.  
Lastly, technological innovation and the transformation of the financial markets have 
brought about huge changes in terms of regulation, particularly in comparison between the 
EU and the UK strategies. On the one hand, the EU strategy has laid the foundation for a new 
way of dealing with the securities sector, which is characterised by consumer protection and 
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an investor-disclosure system
58
. On the other, the UK strategy has launched the ‘outcomes-
based’ regime governed, not only by rules but also by principles, which have to be correctly 
interpreted. In this context, it is possible to observe that the connection between those two 
kinds of strategy can be found in the role and function of compliance: in the EU system, there 
is an early stage of compliance, recently revitalised in the MiFID, whilst in the UK system 
compliance is already extremely highly developed. However, that system of compliance 
provided for by MiFID would have sparse efficiency in the UK, since it is not viewed as a 
self-regulatory measure with legal force, but rather as an additional burden for firms
59
.  
 
5.  The most recent securities market reforms (the MiFID 2 in the EU system and 
‘principles-based’ regulation in the UK) have constituted an important innovation in terms of 
regulatory approach and financial stability. However, the two systems with their different 
features, are still considered separately; in fact, the EU legislation - namely the ‘de 
Larosière’60 process and the Banking Union architecture61 - appears, from a UK perspective to 
constitute a legal obstacle to rule-making by the FCA. It has been pointed out that “the risk of 
principles-based regulation in the EU context is thus simply the risk of implementation of 
Principles at the national level moved up to the supranational level”62. Specifically, the major 
criticism starts from the premise that the MiFID 2 has imposed a detailed and burdensome 
system of rules into or on top of the UK Principles system. In contrast, the key point to stress 
is the fact that both systems incorporate a ‘principles-based’ regime (in the case of the EU as 
an instrument for harmonisation among Member States). It is possible to argue that there is a 
worthwhile link between the two regulatory strategies and that the EU and the UK have 
adopted the same framework in different institutional contexts.  
The major elements are the use of self-regulation and a mixed rules-based and ‘principles-
based’ regime with the compliance function acting as the enforcement measure. 
Firstly, both the EU and the UK financial markets legislation adopt a form of self-
regulatory approach. With the MiFID Directive, the Community legislator has introduced a 
set of provisions clearly characterised by voluntary conducts on the part of business (for 
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instance, the suitability regime and best execution) that delegate to market participants the 
power of behaviour control, while the UK legislator has recently reinforced its attitude with 
regard to self-regulation by enhancing the mentioned ‘outcomes-oriented’ regime.  
As indicated, one of MiFID’s fundamental goals is harmonisation as between Member 
States and the introduction of an enhanced single framework of provisions. It can be pointed 
out that the MiFID has created a single system for cross-border transactions with an efficient 
integration of securities products in which market participants are clearly accountable for their 
acts. In particular, the new classification of clients (i.e. retail, professional or eligible 
counterparty) has produced a remarkable disclosure regime, combined with a high level of 
consumer protection. In this way, the principles of good faith, trust and fairness are embodied 
in intermediaries’ behaviours. It may be noted in this context, moreover, that the investment 
advice having to be given to the client during the business operation can be compared to the 
eleven Principles for Business set out in the FCA Handbook
63
. In this context, the 
appropriateness and suitability test (MiFID, Art. 19) constitute the concrete application of best 
practices; consequently, the UK principles find their application in a common ground of 
mutual rules established by EU legislation. 
Secondly, it is possible to observe that there is a relationship between the regulatory 
regime of MiFID and the FCA’s rule-making, since both use a mixed system of rules and 
principles.  Closer examination prompts a number of observations: the UK regulatory system 
leaves to principles the power to regulate firms’ behaviours, which means that the securities 
market regulates itself through internal management controls and the monitoring of the FCA. 
In substance, the principle is regarded as a general rule, or a second level of statutory norm 
that deploys its legal force under the risk of misconduct and a risk of non-compliant 
behaviours; as a result, whereas the principle ensues from a decision by the Authority, market 
participants have to play an active role in ensuring that it is effective. In other words, the UK 
system is characterised by self-induced regulation through flexibility of principles, monitoring 
of management behaviours and a system of internal controls
64
.   
In the same vein, but in a different institutional context, the MiFID establishes principles 
within its prescriptive provisions; the principle is inserted into the norm, thereby bringing 
about a mixed system where self-regulation is combined with normative regulation. For 
example, the conduct of business provided by Articles 19, 21 and 22 provides for the 
“investment advice or personal recommendations regime” and requires a set of ethical 
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principles in order to ensure that “an investment firm acts honestly, fairly and professionally 
in accordance with the best interests of its clients”65; in short, the principle is at the same time 
a statutory norm. 
Thirdly, both regimes promote the culture of compliance as an incentive to prevent risk-
taking and provide legal liability, particularly, in terms of an adequate level of enforcement of 
principles; however, it has been argued that ‘self-induced compliance in the UK system can 
sometimes determine inefficiencies of enforcement in respect of misconduct’66. Whereas the 
institutionalised compliance provided for in the EU system acts as a form of supplementary 
(more stringent) enforcement, both combined with the statutory norm operate through ad hoc 
internal corporate bodies (internal audit committees). In this regard, the possible risks of 
compliance failures consist, on the one hand, of creative compliance (i.e. where although the 
spirit of the norm is adhered to, it is sometimes interpreted over-generously) and, on the other, 
of over-compliance (i.e. over-regulation or additional burdensome levels of enforcement).  
The compliance function can be well-functioning on the basis of trust and fairness 
behaviours, which means confidence, transparency and cogent acts
67
; in other words, 
substantive compliance represents the key objective for fostering responsive regulation. In 
sum, recent financial events have shown how the UK system - albeit having a highly 
developed principles-based regime - has been characterised by a species of creative 
compliance in terms of superficial controls and according solely with the surface content of 
the rule
68
. In contrast, the EU regulatory system has developed a form of substantive 
compliance (according not only with the letter, but also with the spirit of the law), protected 
by corporate mechanisms of controls and structured within the legal platform of the MiFID. 
Finally, it can be argued that the implementation of the EU Directive in the UK Conduct of 
Business has determined an innovative change in terms of transparency and responsibility to 
financial consumers
69
. 
 
6.  Questions of legitimacy and accountability are linked to the utmost degree with 
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consumer protection policy
70
. In this regard, the UK system has set out, in sections 3-6 of the 
Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (FSMA 2000), significant regulatory objectives, 
such as market confidence, public awareness, consumer protection and reduction of financial 
crime, together with adequate consumer regulation
71
. Market confidence can be considered 
the key objective, in terms of investor protection, on account of its fundamental role of 
achieving soundness of the financial markets. Consequently, by avoiding the legal risks, the 
market reduces the risk of failures (and hence of reputational risk).  
The important aspect is that of correcting imbalances of information between producers 
and consumers of financial services. A controversial question is whether the UK legislation 
affords an adequate level of consumer protection; indeed, it can be observed that, whilst on 
the one hand section 5(1) of FSMA 2000 ensures “an appropriate degree of protection for 
consumers”, on the other, section 5 (2) provides that “in considering what degree of 
protection may be appropriate, the Authority must have regard to (d) the general principle that 
consumers should take responsibility for their decisions”. In this regard, it has been observed 
that “an evident lack of certainty and clarity underscores the limits of the UK consumer 
protection system”72. By contrast, the EU legislation with MiFID has imposed a stringent 
assessment of investor guarantees through “the fair presentation of investment 
recommendations and the disclosure of conflicts of interest”73.  
Broadly, legitimate and accountable regulation prevents the potential risk of confidence 
failure and promotes a clear understanding of consumer protection law; in this context, an 
innovative challenge has been set by the Office of Fair Trading, a government agency 
appointed to improve the consumer protection legislation through informative leaflets or 
booklets, guidance and publications of best practices
74
. The English Courts have made 
appreciable advances in terms of consumer protection by confirming the tendency to consider 
consumers as an active part of financial markets
75
; particularly in the banking sector, the 
promotion of banking codes of best practices (The Banking Code and Business Banking 
Code, March 2008) has demonstrated an important change in policy towards consumers.  
The need for proper supervision system in the securities sector which should enhance 
efficient regulation by EU regulators and domestic authorities is manifest; the current 
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financial instability has underscored the existence of a complex, confused structure 
characterising the approach to supervision, not only at European level, but also at national 
level. In order better to appreciate how this could be resolved by moving towards a single 
financial supervisory system, fundamental developments must be taken into account.  
Recently, there has been a constructive debate involving the EU institutions, scholars and 
commentators as to a possible approach to supervision under the Banking Union which could 
be capable of preventing the risk of market failures. In particular, recent proposals have 
shown a clear preference for establishing an integrated structure to coordinate cross-border 
bank supervision and resolution
76
. This proposal stems from past experience with different 
supervision models, such as the institutional model, the functional model and the integrated 
model
77
. The proposed scheme, which would have characteristics of its own, would reflect the 
main purposes of the supervision function: prudential supervision, ensuring the financial 
stability of whole securities sector and the conduct of business supervision, combined with 
disclosure and investor protection systems incorporated in the internal management 
controls
78
.  
The financial supervision architecture is moving from an institutional and functional 
model towards an integrated approach where the role of national authorities is coordinated by 
one independent single network of financial supervisors; in this manner, a clear distribution of 
roles and functions between financial regulators will make for integrity and uniformity of 
acts
79
. For example, in terms of accountability, a clear division of responsibilities was set out 
in the ‘Memorandum of Understanding’, which allocated the different functions among the 
Treasury, the Bank of England and the FSA
80
. 
Under the European Banking Union there has been a strong call for an ongoing dialogue 
between institutions and a constant exchange of information amongst the individual 
supervisory authorities. Manifestly, this objective could be achieved with an integrated 
supervision approach under which the supervisory function should be effective, transparent 
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and accountable to the political institutions. Concurrently, it has been argued that “a single 
financial market needs a single financial supervisor with a set of harmonised supervision 
powers”81. It can be cogently observed that such a supervisory solution would supply a 
plausible, definitive solution to the risk of monitoring loopholes and provide a response to the 
emergent co-operation between national supervisors and European regulators. It can also be 
reasonably noted that a strong improvement of risk management, together with the 
enforcement of internal compliant behaviours, should be implemented when tackling the new 
challenge of the reform of supervision. In other words, in introducing a single supervisory 
body it is necessary to implement continuing co-operation and coordination of functions with 
a permanent dialogue between national and European authorities
82
. 
Effective reform of financial market should entail a radical change in corporate 
behaviours. In order to achieve this goal, a proposal for substantive compliance as a response 
to judgement-based and principles-based regimes may be significant in the long run.  
In this way, the compliance function not only assumes a normative value, but also 
constitutes a useful measure for enforcing principles; in other words, substantive compliance 
is instituted by means of compliant management
83
. Logically, this new way of regulation 
would require responsive behaviour of market participants and would involve forms of self-
enforcement; also, however, it would introduce a concept of responsible management 
characterised by capability and the ability to combine “the versatility and flexibility of 
voluntary self-regulation, avoiding many of the inherent weaknesses of voluntarism”84. 
A system of internal controls represents the most important element of independence and 
trusteeship, which helps achieve market confidence and accountability; however, in order to 
promote substantive compliance there must not only be support from management but also a 
commitment to statutory legislation. The idea of substantive compliance, in a merit-based 
regime for example, does not seek to diminish the significance of the risk-based and 
principles-based approach, but sets out to make corporate securities participants an active part 
of the self-regulation decision-making process.  
In order to achieve more participative regulation on the part of market actors, the 
compliance culture should facilitate less intrusive statutory intervention. As has been argued 
“governments may achieve greater compliance by engineering a regulatory system in which 
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they themselves play a less dominant role, facilitating the constructive regulatory participation 
of private interests, and relying on more or less naturally occurring regulatory orderings”85. 
This will entail the involvement of compliance in the formation of the self-regulation regime 
and in the statutory law-making process. In sum, substantive compliance necessitates the 
existence of a strong link between rules and principles and can be regarded as being a 
characteristic of self-induced regulation and enforcement in the EU and UK context. For 
instance, in the European securities system, compliance is provided by statutory norms (i.e. 
MiFID) and monitored by Community law; whilst in the UK financial structure, compliance 
is managed under the responsibility of senior management, on the basis of the FCA’s 
principles and is left to the firm’s internal controls86.  
The effectiveness of internal controls can allow action to be taken against behaviours 
amounting to misconduct and can permit a sound system of risk management to be applied. In 
addition, the implementation of substantive compliance enables best practices to be 
incorporated into the market-based regime, which will result in a new system of governance 
of the securities market. It has been pointed out that “in the compliance context, new 
governance permits a dynamic and continually re-evaluated internal understanding of 
compliance”87. Principles improve voluntary norms and self-enforced behaviours and provide 
an incentive for the daily mechanisms of management control. Lastly, a possible path of 
financial reform could consist in improving effective fairness in respect of business conducts 
so as to reduce the reputational risk of the firm. This means better regulation
88
 in terms of 
substantive compliance culture and an active role on the part of market participants.  
The movement towards a risk-management culture, based on voluntary forms of 
regulation, has definitely changed the regulatory strategy of securities governance
89
. In 
particular, the establishment of induced moral corporate practices, under the compliance 
watchdog, has altered the spirit of the ‘principles-based’ regime: from ethical and formal 
behaviours to enforced effective norms of conduct. The successful use of principles over rules 
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has raised an important question: how to provide an adequate enforcement measure to counter 
the legal risk
90
 of a failure of internal controls. In this connection, the system of members’ 
credibility has proved to be inefficacious for ensuring that fairness and good faith are properly 
applied. The role of the compliance function, as an ex ante legal measure to prevent the risks 
of statutory enforcement loopholes, becomes an important link between the rules-based and 
‘principles-based’ regulatory approaches by conveying these types of regulation into the risk-
based regime. A risk-based approach entails the active participation of financial members, in 
other words, it entails making principles more concrete
91
. But risk management involves 
compliance (regulation of internal controls) and stimulates it in terms of the effective 
detection of non-compliant behaviours.  
The 2007-09 financial crisis has revealed all the distortions involved in managing 
securities products, but, at the same time, it has altered the prevailing sentiment with regard to 
regulation into a recognised need for a mixed regime of principles and rules. In this context, 
the European legislation with its normative system enshrined in the MiFID Directive has 
imposed a new legal platform where principles and rules coexist and the monitoring function 
of internal management organisations is strengthened.  
 
7.    Despite the proliferation of various headline terms such as outcomes-oriented 
regulation and judgement-based regulation, the underlying approach within the practice of 
financial regulation is a morphed version of the principles-based approach where high level 
principles accompany a selection (sometimes a large selection) of detailed rules. To ensure 
their effective co-functioning, regulated entities and regulators need to develop a better shared 
understanding of which stakeholders could be affected by risks and the consequences i.e. the 
risk-to-whom question. An outcome oriented, judgement-based approach may better lend 
itself to the achievement of this alongside such a principles-based regime. But first and 
foremost, the exercise of good judgement is tied to regulatory intentions and commitment, 
and sufficient resourcing of regulators. The approach that efficiencies are only gained through 
a reduction in regulatory burdens for firms is a convenient myth when one considers the short 
and longer term costs posed by the GFC.  
It appears to us that at least in the UK more attention must be paid to the development of a 
comprehensive safety culture within financial services, rather than a supposedly pragmatic 
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non-zero-failure approach which could easily mistakenly create the legitimacy to eschew 
regulations and cause stakeholder detriment on an ongoing basis. More attention must also be 
paid to consider the allied questions of whether and how regulators could and should address 
the challenges posed by regulatory arbitrage, lobbying and revolving doors, which in turn 
could adversely affect the scope and implementation of regulatory approaches, no matter how 
well-intentioned they are to begin with. 
 
